Detecting Hidden Behaviors in LLMs via Activation-matched Finetuning

arXiv:2609.00351v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models can hide hidden behaviors that activate only under narrow conditions, such as backdoor triggers, sleeper-agent deployment cues, sandbagging, or topic-conditioned censorship.

Such behaviors are difficult to detect without prior knowledge what to look for.

We present activation-matched finetuning, an unsupervised detection method that assumes no knowledge of the trigger or the target behavior. Given a suspect model and a publicly available anchor, we finetune the anchor to reproduce the suspect's activations on a small benign corpus, and score each evaluation prompt by the residual between the two models.

Since no benign corpus covers the sparse trigger region, the reference learns the benign computation but not the hidden behavior. Therefore, trigger prompts -- and, crucially, their semantic neighbors -- incur a large residual that signal the presence of unusual behavior to the defender. Testing our method across third-party models and custom models, activation-matched finetuning surfaces hidden behavior reliably.

Furthermore, we empirically consider a natural defense-aware attack and showcase that it fails to suppress our detection method without sacrificing the behavior itself.