Optimizing Byzantine Node Placement in Decentralized Federated Learning

arXiv:2609.01495v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Security evaluations of decentralized federated learning (DFL) typically focus on how Byzantine participants behave, while largely overlooking which participants are compromised.

Yet, because aggregation is distributed over a communication graph, the placement of Byzantine nodes determines how malicious influence propagates through the network.

We therefore treat Byzantine placement as an explicit adversarial decision and formulate the attacker's objective as selecting, under a fixed compromise budget, the set of participants that maximizes its finite-time impact on honest nodes.

To approximate this objective without executing the learning process for every candidate placement, we introduce Byzantine Placement Influence (BPI), a set-level measure derived from the actual gossip dynamics that quantifies the cumulative exposure of honest nodes to Byzantine sources over the training horizon.

Unlike placement criteria based on node centrality heuristics, BPI directly accounts for weighted multi-hop propagation and interactions among compromised nodes. We develop efficient algorithms for optimizing BPI and evaluate them across six heterogeneous graph families, untargeted model poisoning, and backdoor attacks.

BPI-guided placements consistently identify highly damaging configurations across different network structures and remain effective when the linear gossip assumption is relaxed through Byzantine-robust aggregation. Our results show that Byzantine placement is a critical but under-modeled dimension of DFL threat models and robustness evaluations.